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JUDICIAL AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE
LEGISLATOR IN NEW YORK
JOHN ROBERT BROOK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Separation of Powers
"The exigencies of government have made it necessary to relax a merely
doctrinaire adherence to a principle so flexible and practical, so largely a matter
of sensible approximation, as that of the separation of powers."1
0 UR State Legislature is charged with the sole authority for the making
of the laws; executive power is reposed solely in the Governor, and
judicial power in the Judiciary. These three functions of government
were designedly made to be separate and independent of each other for
reasons that will be made clear.
Specifically, I will discuss the legislative branch, attempting to demon-
strate that without violating the spirit of the doctrine of the separation of
the powers of government, the legislative branch nevertheless exercises
some executive and judicial powers.
Although a usurpation of all powers by one of the three coordinate
branches of government would result in the ultimate destruction of our
republic, as experience has taught us, there is nevertheless a certain
sphere in each of the coordinate branches within which each of the
others operates-an overlapping of powers, so to speak.
This theory of the separation of the powers of government, pursuant
to which the three branches stand apart, is not of recent origin. The
history, structure and destruction of the ancient and medieval republics
have taught us that republics will survive, and the freedom and liberty
of the individual is safe from the despotism of one-man rule, only with
due recognition of the doctrine, coupled with an adequate system of
checks and balances.
Historical Development of the Doctrine
The classic example of the ancient republic is Athens. There the Agora,
a legislative institution, was the governing body and there was no limit
upon its powers. The power of the state was supreme and any one or
group who controlled a majority of the Agora would hold in his or their
hands the total power of government-legislative, judicial and executive.
What happened to Athens without a separation of the powers of gov-
* Member of the New York State Assembly. Member of the New York Bar. Currently
with the firm of Breed, Abbott & Morgan, New York City.
1. Cardozo, Ch. ., Matter of Richardson, 247 N.Y. 401, 410, 160 N.E. 635, 657 (1923).
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ernment? Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries, convinced that we could
learn much from the history of the Athenian Republic, observed:
"From the incurable defect, among others, of . . . the want of a due and well-
defined separation of the powers of government into distinct departments, that cele-
brated republic became violent and profligate in its career, and ended in despotism
and slavery. The general assemblies of the people, without any adequate checks, as-
sumed and exercised all the supreme powers of the state, legislative, executive, and
judicial. ' '2
The history of the Roman Republic, although it flowered but for a
brief period, is a further warning that without the separation of the
powers of government survival of freedom of the individual is impossible.
Total power was vested in the Senate. The Consulate, advised by an
elected advisory body known as the Comitia, was the ruling body, holding
and wielding the total power of government. It was not a republic as we
know it, but the rudimentary germs were there. Power grasping enemies
of freedom, however, made a mockery of it, which finally ended in the
appearance upon the scene of Julius Caesar, who snatched up the reins
of government and extinguished for some time the flame of liberty.
After the French Revolution in 1789, the French made an attempt to
establish a republican form of government. They created a Senate and a
Chamber of Deputies to govern, but there was no attempt either to dis-
tribute power between the federal government and the governments of
the provinces or to distribute it separately among legislative, executive
and judicial branches. The Republic of France cannot be held up as a
shining example of a democratic form of government, and were it not for
a peculiar defect in French politics resulting in the creation of a great
number of political parties, none of which by itself is able to control a
majority of the legislative branch, this republic, too, would have long
since fallen.
Although the theory of the separation of the powers of government
was, as far back as the Athenian Republic, a recognized one, it was not
clearly formulated and presented as a doctrine until the French critic,
philosopher, and lawyer, Montesquieu, did so in his Spirit of Laws, which
was published at Geneva in 1748.
It is interesting to note Montesquieu's argument and how clearly he
presents the necessity for a recognition of the doctrine of the separation
of powers. After observing the three divisions of government and the
respective spheres in which they must operate, he says:
"The political liberty of the subject is a tranquillity of mind arising from the
opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite
the government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another.
"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in
2. I Kent, Commentaries 232, n. a (1826).
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the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may
arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them
in a tyrannical manner.
"Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legis-
lative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would then be the legis-
lator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence
and oppression." 3
With the appearance of the clearly defined doctrine of the separation
of powers by Montesquieu, there quickly followed recognition by thinkers
of the times. Rousseau took up the theory and expanded it. Black-
stone followed, adopting the argument and expounding it in his Com-
mentaries5
Thus, we come down to the period when the great men of our colonial
times were concerned with the preservation of the freedom and liberty of
the individual. They were searching for an effective means of not only
defending against the tyranny of a greedy monarch, whose acts and de-
crees, although depriving the Colonies of their independence, at the same
time provided fuel for the flame and spirit of individual liberty and
freedom, but also for the creation of an instrument that would reestab-
lish those liberties and freedoms and would constitute forever thereafter
a bulwark of defense against all attempts to destroy them. A Declaration
of Independence was called for, and, drafted by Thomas Jefferson, was
adopted by the Continental Congress on July 4, 1776. The declaration
was one of separation, freedom and independence from the British Crown
because of the "repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct
object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States."
The first step had been taken. The big job, however, lay ahead: the
framing of a constitution which would provide for the creation of a
system of government that would be strong enough to carry out the will
of the people, preserving orderly social intercourse and protecting the
3. lkfontesquieu, Spirit of Laws, Bk. XI c. 6 (1748).
4. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Bk. 2, c. VII.
5. "In all tyrannical governments, the supreme magistracy, or the right both of making
and enforcing the laws, is vested in one and the same man, or one and the -ame body of
men; and wherever these two powers are united together, there can be no public liberty.
The magistrate may enact tyrannical laws, and execute them in a tyrannical manner, since
he is possessed, in quality of dispenser of justice, with all the power which be, as legislator,
thinks proper to give himself." 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 146.
"Were it [the judicial power] joined with the legislative, the life, liberty, and property of
the subject would be in the hands of arbitrary judges, whose decisions would be then regu-
lated only by their own opinions, and not by any fundamental principles of law; which,
though legislators may depart from, yet judges are bound to observe. Were it joined vith
the executive, this union might soon be an overbalance for the legislative." Blackstone,
op. cit. supra at 268.
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people, and also providing a means by which the people would be pro-
tected from that government.
Recognition and Adoption of the Doctrine in the Constitution
of the United States
Immediately the theory of the division of power was adopted as the
obvious device for preventing all power from becoming accumulated in
one set of hands which would be nothing more than following in the foot-
steps of the "fallen" republics. The Constitution of the United States,
the oldest federal constitution in existence, the result of the strenuous
labors of the minds of the great men of that time, who were, during the
course of its drafting, conscious of the dangers of centralizing all power
in one federal government or one division of government, was finally
adopted by a convention of delegates from the different states in May of
1777, and after ratification by the several states, became effective in
1789.
An examination of that famous document shows a healthy recognition
of the doctrine of the separation of powers. It is first applied in sep-
arating, between central governments, the powers reserved to the
states and to the people. We here, however, are concerned with separa-
tion of the powers of the instruments of government.
Man's conduct and his relationship to his fellow men are regulated by
law. The formulation and promulgation of law is necessarily the first
operation in a system of government. The drafters of the Constitution,
therefore, first directed their attention to the creation of a legislative
branch, reposing in that branch all legislative powers.
Article I, section 1, of the Constitution reads:
"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives."
Article II, section 1, deals with the executive power and provides:
"1. The executive Power shall be vested.in a President of the United
States. .... "
Article III, section 1, of the Constitution deals with the judicial power
of the central government and reads:
"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one su-
preme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish."
It is reasonably certain that the order in which the delegation of these
three separate powers appears in our Constitution is of no great moment,
other than perhaps that the drafters of the Constitution commenced with
[Vol. 25
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the Legislature, the division of government which makes the laws, subse-
quently to be enforced and interpreted by the executive and judiciary. It
should be noted that the granting of these three distinct powers appears
separately in the first three articles of the Constitution, and their separa-
tion, therefore, is complete, having no word connection with each other,
thereby indicating a determined effort to keep them separate and apart.
The Legislature, however, constitutes that branch of the government
nearest to the people-the source of all power. Its members are chosen
directly by the people for the purpose of interpreting, in the form of
statutory law, the wishes and the will of the people. The promulgating of
statutory law is, therefore, the first and fundamental step in providing for
the establishment of an ordered society.
Recognition of the Doctrine in the Constitution of the State of New York
Although the first Constitution of the State of New York was adopted
on April 20, 1777, some twelve years before the ratification and final
adoption of the Federal Constitution, its framers, some of whom assisted
in the drafting of the Federal Constitution, recognized that the doctrine
of the separation of the powers of government was the best means or de-
vice for assuring that the central government they were thereby creating
would not become so all powerful as to strike at and overcome the sov-
ereignty of the people, subjugating them to the will of a despot or a
despotic group.
Since the adoption of the State Constitution there have been a number
of revisions and many amendments. Although there have been seven
Constitutional Conventions,' these resulted in only four general revi-
sions.7 Such revisions and amendments have not indicated any deviation
from the recognition of the prime importance of the doctrine of the
separation of the powers of government.
The State Constitution provides in Article III, section 1:
"The legislative power of this State shall be vested in the Senate and
Assembly."
The executive power is delegated by the sovereign people under
Article IV, section 1:
"The executive power shall be vested in the governor, who shall hold
his office for four years; ......
Although there is no specific delegation of the judicial power to the
courts of the State, there is a recognition of the separateness of this
branch of government in Article VI, section 1, which reads:
6. Constitutional Conventions were held in 1S01, 1821, 1846, 1867, 1894, 1915 and 1938.
7. General revisions were accomplished only by the Conventions held in 1821, 1846,
1S94 and 1938.
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"The supreme court is continued with general jurisdiction in law and
equity, subject to such appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals as
now is or hereafter may be prescribed by law not inconsistent with this
article."
The unlimited delegation of legislative power to the Senate and As-
sembly by the Constitution constitutes the New York State Legislature
a most powerful governmental body. As noted at the outset the doctrine
of separation of powers is fundamental to the survival of our republican
form of government. It was also stated, however, that inevitably, though
separate and distinct, there could be, and in our State there is, a border
sphere in each of the three separate divisions of government which over-
laps upon the others.
A close examination of our State Constitution, as presently revised and
amended, will disclose a number of instances wherein powers generally
delegated to coordinate branches have been specifically delegated to an-
other branch. The Governor, as the chief executive, exercises certain
judicial and legislative functions; the Legislature has certain judicial
and executive powers; and the judge, in the course of the administration
of justice, is both a legislator and an executive.
It must be admitted that legislators are, consciously or otherwise,
jealous of the exercise either by the executive or the courts of any legis-
lative function, that is, any legislative function which has not been specifi-
cally delegated by the Legislature to either one of them as incident and
necessary to the proper exercise of their own functions. There are, of
course, such instances, but the author is concerned principally with the
executive and judicial powers or functions of the legislator.
II. JUDICIAL POWERS EXERCISED AND JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS PERFORMED
BY THE LEGISLATURE
Judge Folger reminds us:
"Though the Constitution confers upon specified courts general judicial power,
there are certain powers of a judicial nature which, by the express terms of the
same instrument, are given to the legislative body ... "8
There are some authorities which hold that the basic nature of the
legislative process is in essence a judicial process, for very little legisla-
tion ever originates within a Legislature itself.0 Thus, the Massachusetts
Legislature is known as "The General Court." The principal function
exercised by the individual legislator in the process by which legislation
becomes statutory law is that of weighing the arguments for and against
8. People ex rel. Hatzel v. Hall, 80 N.Y. 117, 122 (1880).
9. See, e.g., Moffat, The Legislative Process, 24 Cornell L.Q. 223 (1938).
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a particular proposal and then rendering his decision (a judicial opera-
tion), adopting or rejecting the proposal as evidenced by his "aye" or
'(nay" vote. The combined "ayes" or "nays" of all of the members of the
particular house constitute their "decision."
The author cannot, however, accept this view, for it is theorizing
without regard to the fundamental concepts of a republican form of gov-
ernment and completely ignores the doctrine of the separation of powers.
I prefer to limit my consideration of this subject to those instances
where the powers of one division of government are specifically delegated
by the Constitution to another and those instances where one division of
government has in practice usurped without specific authority, the powers
of another, or has attempted so to do.
Perhaps the clearest instance of the grant of authority to the Legis-
lature to exercise judicial power is found in Article III, section 9, of the
New York Constitution, which provides that each house of the Legis-
lature shall "be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of
its own members." There have been numerous instances where the right
of an elected member to take his seat in the Senate or Assembly of the
State has been challenged. In my own experience as a member of the
Judiciary Committee of the Assembly, I have participated in two such
challenges.'0
The proceeding is initiated by the challenger filing with the proper
house a petition setting forth his reasons why the member should not be
seated. In form and in fact this is similar to a complaint in a civil
action. The house receiving such petition usually refers it by resolution
to its Judiciary Committee, authorizing such Committee to make a
thorough investigation of the issues raised by the petition and report.
The function then performed by the Judiciary Committee is the actual
conduct of a judicial proceeding. Witnesses for both sides are sub-
poenaed and called upon to testify. Documentary evidence is received,
and upon the completion of such "trial," the Judiciary Committee renders
its judgment in the form of a report and recommendation to the entire
house, which sitting as a Committee of the Whole considers the report
and recommendation and renders its verdict.
Another clear instance is found in Article VI, section 10 of the Con-
stitution which provides for the trial of impeachments.1 The State
10. On petition of Richard R. Griffith v. Jeremiah J. .Ahcroft, 2d Afszembly District,
Oneida County, January 5, 1949. (Mr. Ashcroft was seated.) On petition of Jos2ph P.
Brennan v. John H. Farrell, 3d Assembly District, New vYork County, January 4. 1956.
(Mr. Farrell was seated.)
11. "The assembly shall have the power of impeachment by a vote of a majority of all
the members elected thereto. The court for the trial of impeachments shall be composcd of
the president of the senate, the senators, or the major part of them, and the judges of the
court of appeals, or the major part of them. On the trial of an impeachment against the
1956]
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Assembly is granted by this article the power of impeachment by a vote
of a majority of its members. The actual trial of the impeachment, how-
ever, is conducted by the Senate and a majority of the judges of the Court
of Appeals. This body actually, by Constitutional provisions, is consti-
tuted a court to conduct a trial at which evidence is submitted and a ver-
dict rendered. There have been but few instances of the exercise of this
judicial power by the Legislature.
Many of the powers, judicial in nature, delegated by the Constitution
to the Legislature do not contain authority to exercise a judicial func-
tion, but rather to grant authority to the courts for the enlargement of
their authority or to restrict the authority, functions, or activities of the
courts in the exercise of their powers. There are numerous such grants
in the Constitution. The Legislature is granted the authority to provide
by law that the verdict in a civil jury case may be rendered by not less
than five-sixths of the jury.'12 The Legislature has exercised this power
by the enactment of Chapters 120 and 613 of the Laws of 1937. In the
same section of the same article of the Constitution the Legislature is
granted authority to enact laws governing the form, content, manner
and form of presentation of a waiver by defendant of a jury trial.
Article VI of the Constitution, dealing with the Judiciary, contains
many instances of grants of powers to the Legislature over the courts. In
section 1, among other things, it is granted the power to alter the judicial
districts. By an amendment adopted in 1947, a tenth judicial district
consisting of the Counties of Queens, Nassau and Suffolk was erected
out of the Second Judicial District.
This section also grants to the Legislature the power to increase from
time to time the number of justices in any judicial district. This power
has been exercised upon numerous occasions. 13 In the author's twelve
years of service as a member of the New York State Assembly there has
not been a single year in which legislation attempting to exercise this
power has not been introduced.
The Temporary Commission on the Courts, set up in 1953 pursuant
governor or lieutenant-governor, neither the lieutenant-governor nor the temporary presi-
dent of the senate shall act as a member of the court. No judicial officer shall exercise his
office after articles of impeachment against him shall have been preferred to the senate,
until he shall have been acquitted. Before the trial of an impeachment, the members of the
court shall take an oath or affirmation truly and impartially to try the impeachment accord-
ing to the evidence, and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds
of the members present. judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
to removal from office, or removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
public office of honor, trust, or profit under this state; but the party impeached shall be
liable to indictment and punishment according to law." N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 10.
12. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2, as amended by Constitutional Convention of 1938.
13. N.Y. Laws c. 788 (1952); N.Y. Laws c. 10, § 5 (1948); N.Y. Laws c. 241, § 10
(1946); N.Y. Laws c. 617, § 3 (1944); N.Y. Laws c. 560 (1933).
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to legislative enactment,14 has submitted to the Legislature its recommen-
dation that it exercise this power by increasing the number of judges
of the Supreme Court in certain judicial districts.
The Legislature has been delegated by the Constitution the authority
to alter the boundaries of the judicial departments, restricting such
authority, however, to the extent that this may be done only once every
ten years and further providing that each department shall be bounded
by the lines of judicial districts."
Similarly the Legislature has power to remove from office judges of
the Court of Appeals; 6 to restrict the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals;' 7 to remove from office justices of inferior courts;18 to enlarge
or restrict the jurisdiction of county courts and to increase the number
of county court judges;' 9 to authorize elections of additional judges in
the Court of General Sessions;20 to provide for the election of additional
surrogates; 21 to regulate or discontinue inferior local courts;- to exer-
cise certain supervisory power over the Court of Claims and to refer
to it claims made against the State. -23
Upon the recommendation of the Temporary Commission on the
Courts, the Legislature in 1955 created the Judicial Conference of the
State of New York.24 This body is entrusted with the power and duty
of studying and making recommendations "with respect to the organiza-
tion, jurisdiction, procedures and rules, and the administrative, cleri-
cal, fiscal and personnel practices of all the courts of the state," and,
among other things, transferring to it all of the powers and duties of
the former Judicial Council, which was abolished. By this act the Legis-
lature exercised a further power, perhaps only quasi-judicial in nature,
but nevertheless indicating a friendly trespass into the private preserve
of the Judiciary.
A further instance in which the Legislature exercises a power at least
quasi-judicial in nature, is when it adopts statutes regulating judicial
procedures. The Legislature is vested with the power to regulate these
procedures but apparently only to a limited extent.25
14. N.Y. Laws c. 591 (1953).
15. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 2.
16. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 9.
17. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 7.
18. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 9.
19. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 11.
20. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 14.
21. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 12.
22. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 18.
23. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 23.
24. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 869, adding art. 7A to the Judiciary Law.
25. N.Y. Coast. art VI, § 20 (1925). See Riglander v. Star Co., 98 App. Div. 10i, 105,
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At present it has delegated to the twenty-six justices of the Appellate
Division the power to promulgate rules of procedure as distinguished
from statutory enactments. These rules are the present Rules of Civil
Practice. The Temporary Commission on the Courts has presently under
consideration the question of whether or not there should be further
delegation by the Legislature of its power to regulate rules of procedure.
This question was exhaustively treated in this publication in its Autumn
1955 edition.26
Though a legislator does not look upon himself as a judge nor his
duties as judicial, it must be clearly and abundantly demonstrated with
this recitation of some of the instances in which the legislator exercises
judicial powers, that without destroying or violating the spirit of the
doctrine of the separation of powers, practicalities dictate that the Legis-
lature must perform some judicial functions.
III. EXECUTIVE POWERS EXERCISED AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
PERFORMED BY THE LEGISLATURE
The legislative branch of government may, in addition to exercising
those powers strictly and inherently characteristic of its own branch,
also exercise other powers, some executive in nature, that are reasonably
incidental to the proper performance of its own primary function. It
also has delegated by implication subordinate legislative powers to the
executive. It would be impossible for the Legislature today to prescribe
in the laws it enacts the manner and form in which they are to be
executed or their precise manner of application. Many matters of
necessity must be left to be regulated by the Executive Department.
However, they cannot be considered, when exercised by the executive,
to be a trespass upon the legislative power because they are all incidental
and necessary to the distinct function of executing or carrying out the
laws so enacted.
With the advent of government by agencies, administrative bodies or
commissions during the last twenty-five years, and the exercise by those
bodies of certain powers that are indisputably not only executive powers
but could be generally characterized as quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial,
one might contend that the doctrine of the separation of powers was be-
90 N.Y. Supp. 772, 775 (1st Dep't 1904), aff'd, 181 N.Y. 531, 73 N.E. 1131 (1905), in which
the Appellate Division said: "The courts are not the puppets of the Legislature. They are
an independent branch of the government, as necessary and powerful in their sphere as
either of the other great divisions. And while the Legislature has the power to alter and
regulate the proceedings in law and equity, it can only exercise such power in that respect
as it has heretofore exercised .... "
26. Shaw, Procedural Reform and the Rule-Making Power in New York, 24 Fordham
L. Rev. 338 (1955).
[Vol. 25
JUDICIAL AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
ginning to be undermined and nullified. This, however, in the writer's
opinion, would be an erroneous assumption, for the doctrine does not re-
quire a rigid application nor impose an inflexible definition.
In the final analysis the doctrine is safe, for the legislative branch
of government has the right to stop the further exercise of power it may
have granted or such power as may be exercised by these administrative
agencies, bodies and commissions without specific authorization, either
by the enactment of law or through its power of control over the budget.
It is a fact that most of the instances where the doctrine has been
relaxed have been invariably in favor of the executive branch of gov-
ernment.
A most important responsibility of the Legislature is that of deter-
mining public policy. In carrying out this responsibility the Legislature
must perform a sifting operation whereby there are separated the bills
introduced representing the interest of an individual or small group from
those large organized group demands which deal with matters of public
concern. It must test public opinion on these items of wide public in-
terest and thus formulate policy with respect thereto.
One of the most essential and effective means by which the Legislature
determines or reviews matters of public policy is by exercising its power
of inquiry. This power is not, however, exclusively legislative, for such
power is likewise vested in both the executive and judicial branches of
government.
The means by which the Legislature exercises this power of inquiry is
through its various joint legislative committees, which are established by
joint resolution of both houses and charged with the duty of investigating
and studying particular questions of extreme public interest. There ap-
pears to be no specific constitutional delegation to the Legislature of the
power of inquiry. However, section 9 of Article III of the Constitution
provides: "Each house shall determine the rules of its own proceed-
ings," and, pursuant, to this broad grant, both the Senate and the Assem-
bly have adopted their own rules of procedure conferring upon joint
legislative committees this power of inquiry.
The standing committees of either house, in connection with the con-
sideration of legislation that has been referred to them, may and in many
instances do conduct independent inquiries and investigations and hold
both dosed and public hearings. These committees are armed with the
power to require the attendance of witnesses, to issue a commission for
the examination of witnesses outside of the state, -2 T and are also em-
powered with the right to issue subpoenas, to enforce obedience to a sub-
poena and to administer oaths to witnesses s
27. N.Y. Legislative Law, § 60.
28. N.Y. Legislative Law, § 62(a).
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The duties performed by these various committees in exercising the
power of inquiry are basically administrative and in that respect consti-
tute an exercise by the Legislature of executive powers. With the ever-
increasing delegation of administrative functions and duties to various
boards, agencies and commissions by the executive, there has developed
in recent years a corresponding delegation by the Legislature of investi-
gating functions to joint legislative committees.
Each year the Legislature is called to pass upon resolutions either
continuing presently existing joint legislative committees or creating new
ones. In the 1955 session, ten new joint legislative committees were cre-
ated and twenty-one existing committees were continued.
The Legislature exercises certain other functions that are executive in
nature, such as considering the qualifications of the Governor's nominees
for appointment to public office, conferring with the Governor thereon,
and confirming or rejecting them."9 The Governor has the power to
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction. It is little
known that in the case of a conviction for treason, he only has power to
suspend the execution of the sentence until the case is reported to the
Legislature at its next session, when the Legislature has the right either
to pardon, commute the sentence, direct the execution of the sentence or
grant a further reprieve."0
Arranging and distributing administrative functions to local jurisdic-
tions is another power executive in nature exercised by the Legislature. 1
Perhaps the most important executive or at least quasi-executive func-
tion performed by the Legislature is in its consideration and adoption of
the executive budget.
Traditionally this entire function was performed by the Legislature.
The appropriation of public funds was universally assumed to be essen-
tially and exclusively one of the legislative functions and duties. In
recent years there has developed a movement for budget reform and with
it numerous states, including New York, have so amended their consti-
tutions to provide that the function and duty of initiating and preparing
a budget is left to the executive. 32 The authority over the preparation and
adoption of the executive budget by the Legislature is now considerably
29. N.Y. Const. art. V, § 4.
30. N.Y. Const. art. IV. § 4.
31. In People ex rel. Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532, 545 (1857), Chief Judge Denlo
stated: "It follows that it belongs to the legislature to arrange and distribute the adminis-
trative functions, committing such portions as it may deem suitable, to local jurisdictions,
and retaining other portions to be exercised by officers appointed by the central power, and
changing the arrangement from time to time, as convenience, the efficiency of administra-
tion and the public good may seem to require."
32. N.Y. Const. art. VII, adopted by Constitutional Convention of 1938.
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curtailed. The Constitution, however, requires that the Governor shall
submit to the Legislature:
"... a budget containing a complete plan of expenditures proposed to be made be-
fore the close of the ensuing fiscal year and all moneys and revenues estimated to be
available therefor, together with an explanation of the basis of such estimates and
recommendations as to proposed legislation, if any, which he may deem necessary to
provide moneys and revenues sufficient to meet such proposed expenditures."33
Bills containing the proposed appropriations are submitted with the
budget and introduced directly by the Governor rather than through a
member of the Legislature or one of its committeesP-
The Legislature may strike out or reduce items in the recommended
budget and may add items of appropriation. Thus, budget bills are con-
sidered carefully by the Finance Committees of the two houses, which
invariably call for a joint public hearing. Prompt action thereafter is
taken by both houses. It is significant that the Legislature receives the
proposed budget from the Governor on the first day of February of each
year (it has been stated that adopting the budget is the most important
act performed by the Legislature each year) and it is always acted upon
by the Legislature before the first day of April. It is not to be presumed
that such prompt action has any relation to the fact that the State's fiscal
year commences on that day and there would be no funds available for
the support of State government without appropriations.
The degree to which the doctrine of the separation of the powers of
government is observed and the extent to which it is carried out is often
directly related to the political complexion of the legislative and execu-
tive branches of government. It might well be asked what has politics
to do with the separation of the powers of the three coordinate branches
of government. It is well to remember that man vested with authority
continues to seek greater authority. Just so does a branch of govern-
ment to which has been constitutionally delegated authority seek even
greater authority. This seeking of additional authority and attempting
to trespass upon the powers and authority of the other branches of gov-
ernment is never so apparent as when there is an executive of one political
party and a Legislature controlled by another. It is inherent in our party
system that the party in control of the two branches of government-
legislative and executive-inevitably uses that control for furthering and
strengthening its political interests and fortunes.
The first executive budget under the 1927 amendment to the New
York Constitution was submitted to the Legislature by the then Gov-
ernor Franklin D. Roosevelt and was accompanied by bills for appropri-
33. N.Y. Const. art. VII, § 2.
34. N.Y. Const. art. VI § 3.
1956]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ations. The Legislature promptly struck out numerous items and added
or substituted therefor similar items of its own, all of which were vetoed
by the Governor. This was the beginning of a controversy that developed
into a show-down that could only be resolved by the courts. The maneu-
ver employed by the Republican controlled Legislature was to condi-
tion the expenditure of certain lump sum appropriations on the approval
of the Governor, the Chairmen of the Senate Finance Committee and the
Assembly Ways and Means Committee. The result was that the Legis-
lature assigned or committed to its own members control of the expendi-
ture of appropriations amounting to approximately $32,000,000, with all
the patronage that such power necessarily carried with it. The Court of
Appeals pronounced the executive to be the winner in what was then
known as the Executive Budget Case."
No court test of strength is reported since this decision, but from 1929
until the election of a Republican governor in 1942, there was a constant
struggle between the executive and legislative branches of our State gov-
ernment over the preparation and adoption of the executive budget, re-
sulting in many legislative delays, while compromises were being worked
out. The powers of the Chairmen of the two Finance Committees, par-
ticularly the Chairman of the Assembly Ways and Means Committee,
were greatly enhanced. In fact, during those years two separate budgets
were prepared, one by the Executive and the other by the Legislature,
resulting in much duplication of effort, but always reflecting the attempt
of those two branches of government to encroach upon or usurp the
powersof each other, engendered and intensified by politics.
In the next twelve years during which the executive branch was under
the control of a strong Republican administration and during which
period there were large Republican majorities in both houses, the struggle
between the executive and legislative branches of the government sub-
sided to a great degree, for the political interests of both of these branches
were identical and politics, therefore, did not make its influence felt upon
the observance of the application of the doctrine of the separation of
powers by these two branches.
The author's observations during that twelve year period and his per-
sonal experiences convinced him that in the circumstance where the execu-
tive and legislative branches were under the control of the same political
party, the legislative branch was more willing to permit encroachment
upon its sphere of separate authority by the executive than the executive
was to permit any of its authority to be usurped by the Legislature. This
35. People v. Tremaine, 252 N.Y. 27, 168 N.E. 817 (1929), holding that the provision
of the appropriations statute was unconstitutional, violating § 7 of article III of the Con-
stitution prohibiting members of the Legislature from holding other civil offices.
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circumstance, however, may not be so true where the executive powers
are not exercised by a strong and independent man.
IV. CONCLUSION
Neither branch of the government will be weakened by these encroach-
ments or attempted usurpations and the doctrine of the separation of
the powers of government will not have been thereby violated, for men
in government are practical men recognizing readily those situations
wherein the spirit of compromise must necessarily be applied. They are
aware that a theory so fundamental as the doctrine of the separation of
powers to the survival of our republican form of government is not to be
observed with such extreme rigidity as to make impossible the attain-
ment of its golden objective.
